In our European Economic Review (2002) paper, we used pre-1998 data on countries participating in and leaving currency unions to estimate the effect of currency unions on trade using (then-) conventional gravity models. In this paper, we use a variety of empirical gravity models to estimate the currency union effect on trade and exports, using recent data which includes the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). We have three findings. First, our assumption of symmetry between the effects of entering and leaving a currency union seems reasonable in the data. Second, our preferred methodology indicates that EMU has boosted exports by around 50%. While other estimation techniques yield different results, a panel approach with both time-varying country and dyadic fixed effects on a large span of data (across both countries and time) seems to deliver insensitive and reliable results. Third, different currency unions have different trade effects.
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Introduction
In this paper we estimate the effect of currency unions on trade. More specifically, we estimate this effect using a variety of models and a panel of annual data that covers more than 200 countries between 1948 and 2013. We do so to check the results of our European Economic Review (2002) paper as well the rich empirical literature on the trade effects of currency unions that followed.
1 Our 2002 paper used a panel approach to investigate the effect of currency unions on trade using data through 1997. That work involved an assumption, a caveat, and some analysis. In this paper, we examine each.
Motivation: An Assumption, a Caveat, and a Finding
In this paper, we use a data set that includes fifteen years of data for the Economic and
Monetary Union in Europe, hereafter "EMU". We take advantage of this to ask three questions.
First, we test whether our earlier assumption of symmetry between currency union entry and exit is justified in the data. The data set of our EER (2002) paper included only 16 switches into but 130 switches out of currency unions before 1998. Given the paucity of data on entries into currency union, we explicitly assumed symmetry between entries and exits. 2 We can now check this assumption, since the many entries into EMU give us a non-trivial number of observations of currency union entries.
Our second question is related: do all currency unions have similar trade effects? While we examine a large number of currency unions, we are most interested in whether EMU has a trade effect similar to that of other currency unions; EMU is the largest and most important 2 monetary union. Our EER paper included no data on EMU, so we were cautious about the relevance for EMU:
"Caveats. There are issues associated with the applicability of our results. Since our sample ends before EMU, most of the currency unions involved countries that were either small, poor, or both; our results may therefore be inapplicable to EMU."
The relevance of our original estimate for EMU has been questioned on the grounds that it largely reflects the experiences of small dependent economies in currency unions with large anchor countries. It is unclear how much the experience of the Bahamas, which adopted the dollar as its currency in 1966, applies to the experience of industrial countries such as
France and Germany, which jointly adopted the euro. In fact, influential recent papers estimating the trade effects of EMU have generally found smaller effects than our previous estimate of the effect of currency unions. 3 However, most of these studies work with relatively small samples of industrial, mainly European countries. Further, since many were done shortly after the establishment of the euro, most have relatively short time series. 4 Only a few papers distinguish between the effects of EMUs and other currency unions with a large sample of countries over a long time period, including Frankel (2008) and Eicher and Henn (2011) .
Finally, we ask whether the (many) advances in empirical modeling of trade flows since our EER (2002) paper are materially relevant to estimating the currency union effect on trade.
We worked hard in our earlier work to ensure that our results did not depend strongly on our precise methodology. For instance we wrote (italics added):
"To summarize: a number of different panel estimators all deliver the conclusion that currency union has a strong positive effect on trade. … Our fixed effects estimates indicate that entry into/departure from a 3 currency union leads bilateral trade to approximately double/halve, holding a host of other features constant. This result is not only economically and statistically significant, but seems relatively robust..."
"This result is economically large, statistically significant, and seems insensitive to a number of perturbations in our methodology."
The last dozen years has seen considerable methodological work in the area, perhaps most importantly the contributions of Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) . The literature has been ably surveyed recently by Head and Mayer (2014) ; see also Baldwin and Taglioni (2007) . We take advantage of this progress by estimating the effect of currency union on trade using newer techniques. We pay particular attention to the effects of selective sampling across time and countries.
To preview our conclusions, we find that: a) symmetry looks OK; b) EMU is way different from other currency unions; and most disturbingly c) while different methodologies deliver wildly different results, there is reasonable evidence that EMU has a strong positive effect in stimulating trade. Our preferred methodology -a panel approach with both dyadic and timevarying exporter and importer fixed effects on a long broad data set -seems defensible and leads us to conclude that EMU has had a substantive effect in expanding European trade.
Initial Methodology and Data Set
We are interested in estimating the effect of currency unions on aggregated international trade. In our EER paper, we estimated a gravity model of international trade which was conventional for the time:
where i and j denote countries, t denotes time, and  T ijt denotes the average nominal value of bilateral trade between i and j at time t,  CU is unity if i and j use the same currency at time t and 0 otherwise,   is a vector of nuisance coefficients,  Z is a vector of controls,  {δ} is a mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive set of year-specific effects,   ij represents the myriad other influences, assumed to be well behaved.
As (Z) controls, we use a standard collection of (thirteen) determinants from the gravity literature: the products of national real GDP and real GDP per capita, the distance between the countries, the product of national land masses, dummy variables for the number of landlocked and island countries in the dyad, and dummy variables if the countries share a common language, land border, regional trade agreement, and (variants of) colonial heritage.
The coefficient of interest is γ, which represents the partial trade impact of currency union. This effect ignores at least four related phenomena which may affect the impact of currency union on trade: a) omitted variables, b) effects of currency union between i and j on other countries through so-called "multilateral resistance" effects; c) general equilibrium effects on spending and output for all countries; and d) the homogeneity implicit in treating all currency unions alike. The omitted variable problem is particularly relevant in light of the inherent challenge of including all relevant determinants of bilateral trading relationships. As emphasized by Baldwin (2006a) and as we show later, controlling for unobserved factors by the inclusion of country-pair fixed effects has a significant effect on results. Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) , Baier and Bergstrand (2009), and Head and Mayer (2014) 
Results with Older (Trade) Models
We present estimates for (1) in Table 1 . For convenience and to provide a basis of comparison, we tabulate the estimates from our EER (2002) paper in the extreme left column.
In our original paper, we estimated the key coefficient γ at 1.30, with a robust standard error of  2.51, with a t-ratio exceeding 9).
By far the biggest recent event in monetary unions has been the establishment of the EMU. In the second column from the right of Table 1 , we separate the EMU effect from the combined effects of all other currency unions, to dramatic effect. 10 The currency union effect rises somewhat to 1.12, but the more interesting point estimate is that of EMU; the net effect of EMU membership is essentially nil in both economic and statistical terms. This is the first indication that EMU has a substantively different effect on trade than other monetary unions.
The column on the extreme right of Table 1 shows that this result is not affected if we disentangle the non-EMU currency unions; it also shows dramatically different estimates for different currency unions.
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The essence of our 2002 paper was to take maximal advantage of currency union status using a panel estimator with fixed dyadic (country-pair) effects, rather than relying simply on the least squares results of Table 1 . The motivation for this was stated explicitly in our EER 2002 paper and remains relevant:
"Above and beyond econometric robustness, the fixed effect estimator has one enormous advantage. Since the within estimator exploits variation over time, it answers the policy question of interest, namely the (time series) question 'What is the trade effect of a country joining (or leaving) a currency union?'"
Another advantage is handling the potential endogeneity of currency unions; Head and Mayer (2014) write "Lacking plausible IVs, the most promising approach is to include country-pair fixed 9 effects ..." For both reasons, we are uncomfortable with estimates that do not include dyadic fixed effects.
Accordingly, we add (more than 14,000) dyadic fixed effects and re-estimate (1); our (within) results are presented in Table 2 . These estimates rely only on time-series variation around dyadic means, and thus account for all country-pair effects, whether observable or not.
Since such dyadic effects are plausibly significant in both statistical and economic terms, we consider the within estimates of Table 2 to be much more believable than those of Table 1 . As in Table 1 , we tabulate results from our earlier paper at the extreme left.
The estimates in we find, and an even higher figure for EMU of .93. 16 Clearly the span of the data set over both time and countries matters, when estimating the trade effects of currency unions; we return to this issue below. 17 The impression of a post-1997 break in the trade effect is reinforced by the Chow tests tabulated in Table 3 . The top row tests the hypothesis of model constancy -identical slopes of γ and {β} -when one compares the post-1997 period with the entire sample. The null hypothesis of model constancy is grossly inconsistent with the results of both the least squares estimator of Table 1 and the fixed effects estimator of Table 2 . The bottom row of Table 3 also finds non-constancy for a narrower hypothesis; EMU observations need to be modeled differently from other currency union observations.
Symmetry
The results in Tables 1 and 2 are attempts to estimate the steady state effect of currency union on trade, ceteris paribus. A related question is whether the effects of currency union entry and effect are symmetric. In our earlier paper, we had a large number of observations on exits from currency unions but only a small number of entries into currency unions; hence we were forced to assume symmetry between the dynamic trade effects of currency union exit and entry. Since EMU began in 1999, we now have fifteen years of EMU data and can use this to test our assumption of symmetric dynamics. We begin with graphs.
We replace our simple currency union dummy in (1) with lags after both currency union exits and entries and re-estimate our equation; we then use these results to test the hypothesis of equality between the dynamic trade effects after currency union exit with the (opposite signed) effects after entry. We use fourteen lags for obvious reasons, and add a comparable number of leads (before both currency union exit and entry) so as to be able to test for symmetry in the run-up to monetary union exit/entry. That is, we estimate:
where: CUENTRY ijt-k is 1 if countries i and j entered a currency union at time t-k and 0 otherwise;
CUEXIT is defined analogously for exits from current union; and we let k run from -14 to 14.
The point estimates of {φ}, estimated with dyadic fixed effects, are portrayed in the upper-left graph of Figure 1 , along with a +/-two standard error band; the lower-left graph presents estimates of {θ}. We are interested in checking the comparability between EMU and other currency unions. Accordingly, we divide the CUENTRY dummies into two mutually and jointly exhaustive sets of dummies and graph the coefficients on the right side of the figure.
Most of the results in Figure 1 seem intuitive. The effect of currency union on trade is substantial, in both economic and statistical terms, before currency union exit. Upon exit, the effect starts to shrink in both economic and statistical terms, though it lingers on even fourteen years after exit. The effect after currency union entry is also striking; there seems to be a positive effect before entry, suggesting that the event is anticipated or perhaps endogenous.
The statistical effect of currency union entry on trade seems substantial, even long after entry.
Estimates of (1') allow us to test for symmetry rigorously. We are particularly interested in symmetry between the (dynamic) effects of entry into and exit from currency union. We ask "Does the additional boost to trade after currency union entry k years ago equal the reduction in trade after currency union exit k years ago?" 18 Since we estimate both leads and lags before entry/exit, we can test for symmetry both before and after currency entry/exit, as well as both before and after simultaneously. Our F-tests are tabulated in Table 4 ; the different columns present results from our least squares and fixed effects estimators.
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The hypothesis of symmetric trade effects of currency union entry/exit works reasonably well for the fixed effect estimator, as indicated by the low F-tests. For both samples of data, the least squares estimates are less consistent with symmetry. We also present results which compare EMU with other currency unions. EMU observations seem to have trade effects which are similar to other currency unions, especially after entry. It is especially striking to us that the fixed effect (FE) estimates are consistent with the hypothesis that the trade effect after EMU entry is symmetric to that after exit from other currency unions; this seems close to validating our original assumption of symmetry. With new data and old methodology, the essence of our earlier work still looks reasonable; the question is whether it stands up to greater econometric scrutiny. We now turn to that question.
Results with Newer (Export) Models
We now pursue "theory-consistent estimation" of the gravity equation, closely following the suggestions in the recent survey by Head and Mayer (2014) ; this technique allows us to address concerns about multilateral resistance and other general equilibrium effects. We rely on the "LSDV" (Least Squares with time-varying country Dummy Variables) technique, which they show works well in many situations. In particular, we estimate:
where:
 X ijt denotes the nominal value of bilateral exports from i to j at time t,
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 {λ it } is a complete set of time-varying exporter dummy variables, and  {ψ jt } is a complete set of time-varying importer dummy variables.
This equation is related to (1), with two substantive differences. First, the equation estimates the effect of currency union on (log) exports rather than trade. Second, it holds constant all country-specific "monadic" phenomena rather than time-invariant dyadic phenomena. 19 Consistently, (2) can only estimate the effect of pair-specific phenomena, like the currency union effect on exports.
The estimate of γ presented at the extreme left column of The analysis presented above suggests that EMU may have a different trade effect than other currency unions. We split off the effects of EMU in our export model of (2); the estimates are presented immediately to the right in Table 5 . Consistent with our earlier results but even more dramatically, the export-stimulating effect of EMU is lower than other currency unions.
While other currency unions now seem to raise exports significantly (e .76 -1 ≈ 114%, with a tratio of 38), the net effect of EMU on exports is negative; the point estimate is -.65 with a standard error of .03. This seems scarcely believable, and dis-aggregating the currency union effects has little consequence.
the context of estimating the currency union effect on exports. 21 Their reasoning is the same as ours above; dyadic fixed effects are plausibly important, and turn out to be critical empirically.
Accordingly, we follow their suggestion on the right-hand side of Table 5 . Adding country-pair fixed effects (to the time-varying exporter/importer effects) reduces the combined currency union effect somewhat, though it remains positive and significant. However, the EMU effect is now positive; EMU is now estimated to raise exports by an economically significant (exp(.43)-1≈) 54%, independent of whether one disaggregates currency unions or not. This effect is not only large but significantly different from zero at any confidence level (the t-ratio exceeds 20).
Thus, the dyadic effects add considerable explanatory power to the exports equation while reversing the negative EMU effect. Indeed, the point estimate of the EMU effect on exports (with dyadic fixed effects) from Table 5 is .43, remarkably similar to the trade effect from Table   2 of .41. Succinctly, making the export model more believable by exploiting only variation around dyadic averages substantially raises the estimate of the EMU effect, just as it did with the older trade models.
Our results in Table 5 with dyadic fixed effects deliver an EMU effect which is significantly positive in both the economic and statistical senses. They stand in contrast with the small and insignificant effects estimated by Baldwin and Taglioni (2007) and Baldwin et al. (2008) , who use a similar specification with country-year dummies and dyadic fixed effects. 22 We think the main reason is the span of the data set across both countries and time. Baldwin and co-authors work with a small sample of industrial countries which is conventional for the EMU-focused literature; moreover, the twenty-five year span of time is less than half of ours. In working paper versions of this paper (available online), we also pursue Poisson pseudo maximum likelihood estimation of these models. 25 We take these estimates less seriously, primarily because we have been unable to estimate an appropriate model for a reasonably large panel for purely computational reasons. To us, a plausible methodology to estimate the currency union effect on trade involves panel estimation with dyadic fixed effects.
We are reassured by the fact that the old-fashioned trade model and more modern LSDV export model deliver similar results when dyadic fixed effects are included, and await computational advances to be able to estimate the Poisson analogues. 26 17
Symmetry
As with our estimation of old-style gravity models, we are interested in whether the effects of currency union exit are symmetric with those of currency union entry; we are also interested in whether currency unions are all alike, or whether EMU is different. Much as we did above in (1'), we re-estimate our model after adding dynamic currency union entry and exit effects to our panel regression for exports. Our results are tabulated in Table 6 and indicate that symmetry works quite well. To summarize, our least squares panel results with time-varying country and dyadic fixed effects, which we consider to be our most plausible econometric model, deliver large positive effects for both the currency union effect on exports and its EMU counterpart. We now ask the question: are all currency union effects on trade alike?
Dis-aggregating Currency Union Effects on Exports
We now focus on the question "Are the trade effects of all currency unions alike?" Table 7 provides estimates of dis-aggregated currency union effects on exports, using (2) supplemented with dyadic fixed effects. The top row is repeated from Table 5 ; it shows clearly that when the eight major currency unions are split off the aggregate currency union dummy and included separately, results vary widely. Some currency unions have large positive effects (the CFA Franc zone, the British pound zone, and the Indian rupee zone), while many have a small effect, and the ECCU effect is negative. The hypothesis of equal CU effects is strongly rejected, as is apparent with the tabulated p-value at the right of the table.
Our results are consistent with those of Eicher and Henn (2011), who stress the importance of breaking out the effects of individual currency unions rather than relying on a single "catch-all" currency union variable. They also find that effects vary greatly across currency union, ranging (in their preferred specification) from as high as .68 for the CFA to .34
for the euro to as low as -.15 for the US dollar zone and -.71 for the ECCU. These relative rankings are comparable to the results we report in Table 7. 27 Table 7 
The Span of the Data
We have repeatedly pointed out that the span of the data set, across both country and time, seems to affect the estimated effect of currency union on trade. We make this issue more concrete in Table 8 , which shows how our most important estimate -the effect of EMU on exports, ceteris paribus -varies with the sample. Our default is to estimate equation (2) with both exporter/importer-time and dyadic fixed effects, conventional regressors, and disaggregated currency unions (though we only record the estimate for EMU). The top-left cell in Table 8 corresponds precisely to that taken from the extreme-right column of Table 5 ; the full sample of 879,794 observations delivers an estimate of the effect of EMU on exports of (exp(.43)-1≈) 54%, a large effect that is highly statistically significant (with a robust t-ratio exceeding 20). The columns immediately to the right show that beginning the sample later, in either 1985 or 1995, has little effect on this estimate despite the loss of observations. However, the three columns at the right hand of the top row show that ending the sample in 2005 has a substantive effect, reducing the estimate by more than half.
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While the effect of later observations on the EMU effect seems large, it is dwarfed by the effects of extra countries. In successive rows, we report the EMU effect for the same ( We tentatively conclude that a complete set of data, spanning a large number of countries and years, is critical when estimating the effect of currency unions on trade. The results of Table 8 indicate that selective sampling by either country or time seems systematically to reduce or eliminate the otherwise robust effect of EMU on exports, despite the robustness we see in Table 7 . Table 8 allows us to reconcile our results with those of the literature, and provide an encompassing explanation of why our stronger, more positive results, are the most plausible.
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Summary and Conclusion
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Coefficients on currency union dummy variables; robust standard errors recorded in parentheses. Least squares estimation; regressand is log bilateral exports. Regressors included but not recorded: regional FTA membership; current colony/colonizer; fixed effects for a) exporter-year, b) importer-year, and c) country-pair. Equality test in right-hand column tests hypothesis of equality for all (nine) currency unions. Annual data for >200 countries, 1948-2013 unless otherwise marked. Other currency unions include those around: Belgian Franc; Portugese Escudo; Pakistan rupee; Jamaican dollar; Mauritius rupee; New Zealand dollar; UAE dirham; Spanish peseta; Denmark krone; Italian lira; South African rand; West African pound; East African shilling; Malaya ringgit; Palestinian pound; and Dutch guilder. Rose and Stanley (2005) did an early meta-study of this literature which included 34 papers, with seven estimating the trade effect of the EMU. Rose (2008) did a follow-up study of 26 papers with EMU effect estimates. Havranek (2010) extended the sample to 61 studies, with 28 on the EMU and 33 on other currency unions. Our own review of the literature finds that the number of papers reporting panel estimates with gravity models of the trade effects of currency unions has since grown to over 100.
2 Indeed, our abstract includes this assumption as well as our chief finding (highlights added):
"During this sample a large number of countries left currency unions; they experienced economically and statistically significant declines in bilateral trade, after accounting for other factors. Assuming symmetry, we estimate that a pair of countries that starts to use a common currency experiences a near doubling in bilateral trade."
The assumption of symmetry was later repeated in the paper, twice.
3 By our count, there are now over fifty papers that estimate EMU effects in panel gravity models of trade.
